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Abstract
There is an increased willingness to help identified individuals rather than non-identified, and the effect of identifiability
is mainly present when a single individual rather than a group is presented. However, identifiability and singularity effects
have thus far not been manipulated orthogonally. The present research uses a joint evaluation approach to examine the relative
contribution of identifiability and singularity in moral decision-making reflecting conflicting values between deontology and
consequentialism. As in trolley dilemmas subjects could either choose to stay with the default option, i.e., giving a potentially
life-saving vaccine to a single child, or to actively choose to deny the single child the vaccine in favor of five other children.
Identifiability of the single child and the group of children was varied between-subjects in a 2x2 factorial design. In total
1,232 subjects from Sweden and the United States participated in three separate experiments. Across all treatments, in all
three experiments, 32.6% of the subjects chose to stay with the deontological default option instead of actively choosing to
maximize benefits. Results show that identifiability does not always have a positive effect on decisions in allocation dilemmas.
For single targets, identifiability had a negative or no effect in two out of three experiments, while for the group of targets
identifiability had a more stable positive effect on subjects’ willingness to allocate vaccines. When the effect of identifiability
was negative, process data showed that this effect was mediated by emotional reactance. Hence, the results show that the
influence of identifiability is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the literature on charitable giving.
Keywords: identifiable victim effect, singularity effect, resource allocation, trolley dilemma, moral judgment, decision mak-
ing, charitable giving.
1 Introduction
Individuals are more willing to help identified victims than
to help non-identified victims (Schelling, 1968; Jenni &
Loewenstein, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut &
Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 2011; Small, Loewenstein & Slovic,
2007). Further, the effect of identifiability on willingness
to help seems to be greatest when a single victim is in-
volved, the singularity effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2005a, 2005b;
Slovic, 2007; Västfjäll, Slovic, Mayorga & Peters, 2014).
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Both the identifiability and singularity effects represent de-
viations from the rational choice theory, predominant in eco-
nomics, where individuals seek to maximize the relevant
outcome. In the present research, in order to gain new in-
sights on the effects of identifiability and singularity, we
combine previous research on charitable giving with clas-
sical moral dilemmas (i.e., trolley problems) where conflict-
ing values between deontology (e.g., do no harm) and con-
sequentialism (e.g., maximize lives saved) are reflected.
The topic of when and why identifiability and singular-
ity influence moral decision making is a recurring one in
disciplines such as economics, psychology, and moral phi-
losophy. A problem of conceptual divergences commonly
exists when exploring the effects of identifiability and sin-
gularity. The two concepts are sometimes, incorrectly, used
interchangeably. In this study we examine identifiability and
singularity with an experimental design that allows us to es-
timate the relative contribution of these two effects.
1.1 The bystander dilemma and moral deci-
sion making
As indicated this study has two points of departure. The first
is research on moral judgments and more specifically moral
decision making. Moral judgements are typically viewed
as evaluations of the behaviour of an individual with re-
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spect to a set of virtues held as a norm in a certain social
context (Haidt, 2001). Moral decision making, thus, is the
actual choice between two or more alternatives, where in-
dividuals are forced to make trade-offs between competing
moral values. A methodological cornerstone to study moral
judgements is hypothetical moral dilemmas known as trol-
ley problems (see e.g., Foot, 1978/2002; Thomson, 1976;
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley & Cohen, 2001).
This study employs a version commonly referred to as the
bystander or switch dilemma. In this particular dilemma
subjects are presented with a scenario where a runaway trol-
ley is rapidly approaching five people who will be killed if
no action is taken. They can be saved only by actively hit-
ting a switch that will divert the trolley onto another set of
tracks killing just one person.
The bystander dilemma reflects a conflict between the
moral foundations of deontology and consequentialism.
Moral judgments in line with consequentialism are based
solely on maximizing outcomes, while a deontological
moral judgment is based on other factors such as moral du-
ties or rules (e.g., “do no harm”).1 The consequentialist
alternative in the bystander dilemma is to hit the switch,
killing one person while saving the other five, striving to-
ward maximizing the overall benefits. The deontological al-
ternative is to refrain from hitting the switch because this
action is considered morally unacceptable. A no-harm prin-
ciple is then applied disregarding overall consequences, i.e.,
in this case letting one person live at the expense of five.
Most people think it is acceptable to hit the switch in the
bystander dilemma, i.e., to choose the consequentialist al-
ternative (Greene et al. 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin
& Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000).
Studies employing moral dilemmas like the bystander
dilemma have been criticized because they employ artificial
scenarios and therefore suffer from low external validity be-
cause of the lack of psychological realism (Bauman, Mc-
Graw, Bartels & Warren, 2014). These hypothetical scenar-
ios most often concern situations where outcomes involve
life or death while everyday moral decisions that individ-
uals face are usually less dramatic. More realistic scenar-
ios are commonly used in experiments on charitable giving,
but there is a lack of studies using moral dilemmas where
subjects make explicit trade-offs between conflicting values
(e.g., between deontology and consequentialism). Conse-
quently, it is important to explore to what extent findings
from studies on trolley problems are transferable to similar
but more realistic scenarios. Thus, in this study we employ
a less abstract and non-hypothetical version of the bystander
dilemma.
1However, it can be argued that utilitarianism can accommodate duties
when they are the result of legal or institutional rules or even social norms
(Hardin, 1988).
1.2 The effect of identifiability and singular-
ity on charitable giving
The second point of departure for this study is research on
the impact of identifiability and singularity on charitable
giving. Identifiability is commonly manipulated in experi-
ments by presenting information about the recipients of help
with their names, a picture, their age, and/or other personal-
izing information. The general result from previous studies
is that individuals are more willing to help identified victims
when compared to identical scenarios with non-identified
victims (e.g., Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut & Ritov
2005a, 2005b; Västfjäll et al., 2014). However, experimen-
tal evidence by Kogut and Ritov (2005b) suggests that iden-
tifying a groupmay in some experimental cases reduce will-
ingness to help the group as well as sympathy for it. A more
recent study by Ritov and Kogut (2011) also found that iden-
tifying a single individual does not always increase willing-
ness to help. In this latter study identifiability was found to
decrease generosity towards a single victim belonging to the
same in-group, whereas identifiability increased generosity
towards a single victim belonging to an out-group.2
When the effect of identifiability is positive it tends to
be strongest when a single, identified victim is presented
(Kogut & Ritov 2005a, 2005b; Västfjäll, et al., 2014).
An explanation for this is suggested to be the singularity
effect—that is, single victims elicit stronger emotional re-
actions than a group of victims. Kogut and Ritov (2005a,
2005b) hypothesized that the processing of information re-
lated to a single victim might be fundamentally different
from the processing of information concerning a group of
victims. In a series of studies they found that people tend
to feel more distress and compassion when considering a
single, identified victim than when considering a group of
identified victims, resulting in a greater willingness to help
the single, identified victim. Slovic (2007) and Västfjäll et
al. (2014) describe the effects of a “compassion collapse”,
where feelings and meaning begin to diminish for as few as
two victims. It seems that a larger number of victims (i.e.,
two or more) fails to engage the emotions that would moti-
vate charitable actions.
When exploring moral decision making, as defined in the
previous section, individuals are required to make trade-offs
between competing moral values in a joint evaluation sce-
nario. Studies exploring the effects of identifiability and sin-
gularity on helping behavior, however, almost exclusively
use separate evaluations where options are presented in iso-
lation and evaluated separately. For example, subjects’ are
presented with either one child OR a group of children, with
the identifiability of the child/children varying between-
2In-group/out-group was, for example, manipulated by describing the
single child as living in a Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Given that
there is a sharp division in the Israeli society regarding the attitude towards
these settlements the political situation was used to determine in-group/out-
group belonging.
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subjects. After reading a basic story about a child/children
in need, subjects indicate their “willingness to contribute” to
the specified cause. The cause can, for example, be to raise
money in order to pay for an expensive medical treatment
to save the life of the child/children. Hence, subjects do not
have to make an explicit trade-offs between targets, as they
would have to make in joint evaluations, where subjects face
multiple options simultaneously.
Preferences elicited in separate evaluations may be dra-
matically different from those elicited in joint evaluations
(Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount & Bazerman, 1999). Hsee and
Zhang (2004) argue that, when individuals are presented
with a separate evaluation task, they are more likely to find
it difficult to make sense of the task and to evaluate whether
the outcome is positive or not. A joint evaluation design,
however, frames the decision process with regards to the
relevant attributes, thereby making the actual trade-off em-
bedded in a decision task more explicit. To the best of our
knowledge only one study has used a joint evaluation ap-
proach to study the effect of identifiability (Kogut & Ritov,
2005b). However, this study always presented the victims
[single child/group] as identified; no other combinations of
identifying information were investigated. Thus, the rela-
tion between identifiability and singularity effects could not
be explored.
In the present study, subjects are asked to allocate poten-
tially lifesaving vaccines to either one or five children, re-
sulting in an actual donation according to subjects’ choices.
The identifiability of the single child and the group of chil-
dren is varied across experimental groups in a 2x2 factorial
design, in which the effects of identifiability and singularity
on moral decision making can be investigated orthogonally.
Thus, the main objective of this study is to explore the in-
fluence of identifiability and singularity in moral decision
making where conflicting values between deontology and
consequentialism are reflected.
Following previous findings on the effects of identifiabil-
ity and singularity on charitable giving we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: subjects will allocate relatively more vac-
cines to identified children (with name and picture) com-
pared to children presented as non-identified.
Hypothesis 2: the effect of identifiability is larger for a
single child compared to a group of children (singularity ef-
fect).
2 Method
Three separate data collections including in total 1,232 sub-
jects were carried out. More specifically, the sample in-
cluded 581 subjects from Linköping University in Sweden
(Experiment SWE I and SWE II) and 651 subjects from
the population-representative subjects pool at Decision Re-
search in Eugene, Oregon (Experiment USA). In all exper-
iments identifiability and singularity were varied orthogo-
nally across four experimental treatments to which subjects
were randomly assigned. Complete instructions for all ex-
periments are available in the supplement.
2.1 Experiment SWE I
Data collection SWE I was conducted as a classroom ex-
periment at Linköping University with undergraduate stu-
dents in the faculty of arts and sciences. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned to one of four treatments in a 2x2 between-
subjects design. Each treatment presented the same moral
dilemma but differed with respect to which choice option[s]
was [were] presented as identified to the subject. The moral
decision consisted of choosing to give measles vaccines to
either one or five children presented as either identified or
non-identified. The identification details included informa-
tion on the child’s [children’s] age and name[s] and a photo-
graph [photographs]. The photographs depicted children of
similar age and appearance. Subjects were informed that
they were participating in a decision-making experiment
with real outcomes, i.e., that their choice would result in an
actual donation of measles vaccines to UNICEF according
to their decision.
Following the structure of the bystander dilemma, there
was a default option. Subjects could either stay with the
default, which meant that a potentially life-saving vaccine
would be given to the single child (i.e., the deontological
option), or make an active choice to re-allocate so that five
other children received vaccine (i.e., the consequentialist op-
tion). The structure of the four treatments is described be-
low.
Treatment 1 (1 id vs. 5 non-id): the single child was
presented to the subjects with a picture, a name and an
age, while the other five were presented without pictures,
names and ages. The exact phrasing of the vaccine alloca-
tion dilemma in treatment 1 was as follows:
Benge is five years old and lives in Kenya. He
lives in a poor and inaccessible mountain village
where outbreaks of measles frequently occur. The
disease can cause serious injury and even death.
We will donate enough money for one dose of
measles vaccine that will protect Benge from the
disease and its side effects. A vaccination offers
him an opportunity for a better and more secure
future. For the same amount of money we can
vaccinate five children living in another more ac-
cessible, poor, area in Kenya. You can choose to
deny Benge the vaccine in favor of the other chil-
dren. Do you choose to give Benge the vaccine?
Treatments 2, 3 and 4 were identical except for the fol-
lowing differences:
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Treatment 2 (1 non-id vs. 5 non-id): both the single
child and the group of five children were presented as non-
identified.
Treatment 3 (1 id vs. 5 id): both the single child and the
group of five children were presented as identified.
Treatment 4 (1 non-id vs. 5 id): the single child was pre-
sented as non-identified and the five children as identified.
After making their choice, subjects were asked three
follow-up questions related to their emotional response: (1)
how difficult did you find the question was to answer? (2)
how much sympathy did you feel for the single child? and
(3) howmuch sympathy did you feel for the five children? A
1–6 scale was used, where 1 was defined as “not difficult at
all” and 6 was defined as “very difficult” for the first ques-
tion, and “no sympathy”/”much sympathy” for the second
and third questions.
2.2 Experiment SWE II
The second experiment was also conducted as a classroom
experiment at Linköping University with undergraduate stu-
dents in the faculty of arts and sciences. The structure and
instructions of this experiment was very similar to experi-
ment SWE I, but three modifications were made in the de-
sign. First, the sentence “He lives in a poor and inaccessi-
ble mountain village” was excluded because this informa-
tion potentially could make subjects believe that the “more
accessible” place might have alternative ways of getting the
vaccine influencing subjects to choose the single child. Sec-
ond, the wording related to the default option was changed
so that it was expressed more clearly. The exact wording of
treatment 1 in experiment SWE II was as follows:
Benge is five years old and lives in Kenya. He
lives in an area where outbreaks of measles fre-
quently occur. The disease can cause serious in-
jury and even death. We will donate one dose of
measles vaccine that protects Benge from the dis-
ease and its side effects. A vaccination offers him
an opportunity for a better and more secure fu-
ture. Instead of vaccinating Benge it is possible
to vaccinate five other children, living in a simi-
lar situation as Benge. Right now the vaccine is
designated to Benge. However, you can choose to
deny Benge the vaccine in favor of the other chil-
dren. Do you choose to give Benge the vaccine?
The third modification compared to experiment SWE I
was the addition of a series of follow-up questions in order
to explore emotional reactance and emotional upscaling as
possible psychological processes influencing responses. For
example, subjects were asked to state their agreement with
the statement “I felt that the single child should not get a
‘special treatment’ ” (emotional reactance) and “My feelings
for the single child made me feel more intensely for the five
children” (emotional upscaling). A 1–6 response scale was
used, where 1 = “completely disagree” and 6 = “completely
agree”.
2.3 Experiment USA
The third experiment was run in collaboration with Decision
Research in Eugene, Oregon. Subjects were drawn from
a diverse sample of the adult U.S. population included in
the subject pool of Decision Research. The experiment was
conducted as a web survey. Instructions were identical to
experiment SWE II but translated into English. In addition
experiment USA included four treatments to control for po-
tential order effects related to the presentation of the single
child and the group of children. In the additional experi-
mental treatments with reversed order, the group of children
was presented first and the single child second.
3 Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive results divided by treat-
ment from the three experiments SWE I, SWE II and USA.
The table also shows collapsed percentages for experiments
SWE I and SWE II, as well as for USA and USA reversed
order.
Figures 1a-d further illustrate the descriptive results from
experiments SWE I, SWE II and USA. The percentage of
subjects choosing to give the vaccine to the single child, ir-
respective of identifiability, is presented in Figure 1a. Over-
all, a dominant share of subjects chose the benefit maxi-
mizing option when rationing vaccines to children. That is,
there was a general preference for the group of five chil-
dren over the single child. It is nevertheless notable that
a non-negligible share of subjects chose the non-benefit-
maximizing option—on average, across all experiments,
32.6 % distributed the vaccine to the single child.3 The
percentage choosing to allocate the vaccine to the single
child was highest in Experiment USA (42.5%) and lowest
in Experiment SWE II (21.6%). Also, the percentage choos-
ing the single child was significantly higher in Exp. SWE I
(31.4%) than in Exp. SWE II (χ2=6.85, p=.009), suggesting
that the difference with regards to the circumstances of the
single child, potentially affecting the perceived vulnerability
of the single child, had an effect on choice.
Figure 1b illustrates the general effect of identification in
each experiment. Subjects’ proneness to give vaccines to
children presented as identified was tested by pooling re-
sponses where subjects chose the identified option and pool-
ing responses where subjects chose the non-identified op-
tion across treatments 1 (1 id vs. 5 non-id) and 4 (1 non-id
3In total, the subjects’ choices in Exp. SWE I, exp. SWE II and
Exp. USA resulted in 5,781 measles vaccines being distributed through
UNICEF: 411 subjects chose the single child (=1 vaccine) and 1074 sub-
jects chose the group (=5 vaccines).
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Table 1: Descriptive results for Exp. SWE I, Exp. SWE II and Exp. USA.
Treatment 1: Treatment 2: Treatment 3: Treatment 4:
Exp. SWE I 1 id vs. 5 non-id 1 non-id vs. 5 non-id 1 id vs. 5 id 1 non-id vs. 5 id
n 81 92 84 77
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 23, (28.4%) 37, (40.2%) 20, (23.8%) 25, (32.5%)
Women - n, (%) 42, (52.5%) 51, (55.4%) 44, (52.4%) 39, (50.7%)
Mean age 20.9 21.2 20.8 21.3
Exp. SWE II
n 60 61 63 61
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 15, (25.0%) 15, (24.6%) 11, (17.2%) 12, (19.7%)
Women - n, (%) 39, (65.0%) 29, (47.5%) 45, (70.3%) 37, (59.7%)
Mean age 22.8 22.3 22.1 21.9
Pooled Exp. SWE I + Exp. SWE II
n 141 153 147 138
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 38, (27.0%) 52, (34.0%) 31, (21.1%) 37, (26.8%)
Women - n, (%) 81, (57.9%) 80, (52.3%) 89, (60.1%) 76, (54.7%)
Mean age 21.7 21.6 21.3 21.6
Exp. USA
n 82 84 84 81
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 44, (53.7%) 35, (41.7%) 42, (50.0%) 20, (24.7%)
Women - n, (%) 42, (51.2%) 42, (50.0%) 50, (59.5%) 52, (64.2%)
Mean age 46.8 45.5 45.9 43.6
Exp. USA reversed order 5 non-id vs. 1 id 5 non-id vs. 1 non-id 5 id vs. 1 id 5 id vs. 1 non-id
n 80 80 82 78
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 35, (43.8%) 24, (30.0%) 31, (37.8%) 22, (28.2%)
Women - n, (%) 43, (53.8%) 39, (48.8%) 46, (56.1%) 45, (57.7%)
Mean age 45.4 43.2 46.5 44.0
Pooled Exp. USA + exp.USA reversed order
n 162 164 166 159
Subjects choosing the single child - n, (%) 79, (48.8%) 59, (36.0%) 73, (44.0%) 42, (26.4%)
Women - n, (%) 85, (52.5%) 81, (49.4%) 96, (57.8%) 97, (61.0%)
Mean age 46.1 44.4 46.2 43.8
vs. 5 id).4 A binominal test was conducted with the null
hypothesis h0=0.5—meaning that, on average, 50% of sub-
jects would choose the identified option if identification had
no impact on choice. The “zero-effect line” depicted in Fig-
ure 1b represents h0. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected
based on responses in Exp. SWE I and Exp. SWE II, im-
4Treatment 2 and 3 were excluded from the analysis because both
the single child and the group of children were presented as either non-
identified (treatment 2) or identified (treatment 3).
plying that there was no impact from identifiability alone
on moral decisions in these experiments. The overall ef-
fect of identification in Exp. SWE I was slightly negative—
only 47.5% gave vaccines to the identified option. In Exp.
SWE II the general effect of identification was slightly pos-
itive since 52.9% chose the identified option. In Exp. USA,
however, the overall effect of identifiability on choice was
strongly positive (p<.001). In total, 61.1% of subjects in
Exp. USA chose the identified option. Thus, our first hy-
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Figure 1: Proportion (±s.e.) of subjects allocating vaccine to the single child in Exp. SWE I, Exp. SWE II and Exp. USA.
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pothesis that subjects will allocate relatively more vaccines
to identified children (with name and picture) compared to
children presented as non-identified is confirmed by the re-
sults in Exp. USA while this is not the case in Exp. SWE I
and SWE II.
Figure 1c and 1d show the share of subjects choosing to
distribute the vaccine to the single child (Figure 1c) and the
group of children (Figure 1d) when presented as either iden-
tified or non-identified. In Exp. SWE I 26% of the subjects
chose the single child when presented as identified, as op-
posed to 37% when presented as non-identified (χ2=4.37,
p=.037). Thus, a statistically significant negative effect of
identifiability was found for the single child in Exp. SWE
I. When the group of children was presented as identified,
72% of subjects’ chose to allocate vaccines to the group.
This share decreased to 65% when the group was presented
as non-identified (χ2=1.75, p=.186). Although this positive
effect of identification related to the group is not statistically
significant, Exp. SWE I suggests an inverse effect of identi-
fication for a group and a single child.
In Exp. SWE II, where information about the inaccessible
mountain village was excluded from the instructions, less
variation between treatments is seen. As shown in Figure 1c
there was practically no difference in subjects’ willingness
to choose the single child when identified (21%) compared
to when non-identified (22%) (χ2=0.04, p=.850). The effect
of identification for the group of children (Figure 1d) was
weakly positive with the share of subjects choosing to give
vaccines to the group increasing from 75% to 81% when
identified (χ2=1.41 p=.235).
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Table 2: Logistic regressions on giving vaccine to the single child, effects presented as Odds Ratios (OR).
SWEDEN USA
OR sig. OR sig.
Single child identified 0.72 (0.50 – 1.06) 0.093 2.20 (1.40 – 3.46) 0.001
Group identified 0.66 (0.45 – 0.97) 0.032 0.66 (0.42 – 1.03) 0.068
Age 0.93 (0.86 – 1.01) 0.088 1.00 (0.98 – 1.01) 0.586
Female 1.67 (1.34 – 2.46) 0.009 0.79 (0.50 – 1.26) 0.317
The results of Exp. USA differ considerably from those
of Exp. SWE I and Exp. SWE II. Notably, the share of sub-
jects who chose to allocate vaccine to the single child in-
creased from 33% to 52% when presenting the single child
as identified (χ2=11.55, p<.001). The effect of identifica-
tion was also positive for the group of children, although
not as striking as for the single child. The share of sub-
jects who chose to allocate vaccines to the group of children
increased from 52% to 62% when presented as identified
(χ2=3.39, p=.065). Running the experiment with reversed
order of presentation (i.e., the group of children was pre-
sented first and the single child second) the effect of iden-
tifiability on allocation choice remained similar. Interaction
analyses showed no significant interaction between identifi-
ability and order of presentation and thus confirmed a stable
effect of identifiability.5 However, there was a significant or-
der effect related to allocation choice. Independent of identi-
fiability, subjects were more likely to choose the alternative
presented first in the scenario. The share of subjects who
chose to allocate vaccines to the single child decreased from
43% to 35% when the group of children was presented first
in the scenario (χ2=3.95, p=.047). Thus, our second hy-
pothesis that the effect of identifiability is larger for a single
child compared to a group of children (singularity effect)
was supported by the results in Exp. USA but not by Exp.
SWE I and SWE II.
To further explore the descriptive results, we conducted
logistic regression analyses on giving the vaccine to the sin-
gle child (controlling for age and gender). Table 2 shows the
results from these analyses, where the effects are presented
as odds ratios. Analyses of interactions (using logistic re-
gression) showed that the pattern of results regarding the
effect of identifiability did not significantly differ between
SWE I and SWE II (single child: p =.417; group: p=.844).
Thus, we merged data from these experiments in the logis-
tic regression analyses presented in Table 2, using the label
SWEDEN.
In line with what is shown in Figure 1c, the identifiability
5In a logistic regression the choice to allocate the vaccine to either the
single child or the group of children was the dependent variable. Indepen-
dent variables: ID single child, ID group, Age, Gender, Reversed order,
Reversed order*ID single child, Reversed order*ID group.
of the single child reduced the likelihood of subjects choos-
ing the single child in the Swedish sample. However, iden-
tification of the group decreased the odds-ratios of choosing
the single child with 0.34 (i.e. a positive effect of identifica-
tion for the group). The logistic analysis for the American
sample showed a highly significant positive effect of iden-
tifiability of the single child, also when controlling for age
and gender. An additional finding was that females in the
Swedish sample were significantly more likely to give the
vaccine to the single child compared to males. Thus, fe-
males adhere to a higher extent to a deontological no-harm
principle, while men were more likely to adhere to a con-
sequential benefit-maximizing principle. In the American
sample no such gender differences were detected.
To test for differences in effect between Sweden and USA
an interaction analysis was conducted. This interaction anal-
ysis6 showed that the effect of identifying the single child
differed significantly between USA and Sweden (p<.001).
This admittedly post-hoc result suggests that the difference
between Sweden and USA in the effect of identification of
the single child cannot be explained (solely) as a chance
finding. The positive effect of identifying the group, how-
ever, was similar for USA and Sweden (p=0.749 for the dif-
ference).
3.1 Follow-up questions
Responses from the follow-up questions related to subjects’
emotional responses to the dilemma showed that elicited
sympathy was higher for the identified child/children com-
pared to the non-identified child/children in all three ex-
periments. The positive effect of identification on elicited
sympathy was, however, more pronounced in the Swedish
experiments. No differences were found regarding experi-
enced difficulty to respond to dilemmas between the exper-
iments. Thus, subjects did not find it increasingly hard to
make moral decisions due to identifiability. In Exp. SWE II
and Exp. USA subjects were asked if they believed that their
6The full model for the interaction analysis, dependent variable: the
choice to allocate the vaccine to either the single child or the group of
children; independent variables: ID single child, ID group, Age, Gender,
Country, Country*ID single child, Country*ID group.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 5, September 2015 Identifiability and singularity in moral decisions 499
choice would result in a real donation. The average response
was 3.51 in Exp. USA and 3.18 in Exp. SWE II using a six
point scale ranging from 1 = “not convinced at all” to 6 =
“very convinced”.
4 Discussion
4.1 Main findings
Contrary to what is commonly believed and most often
argued in the literature (e.g., Schelling, 1968; Jenni &
Loewenstein, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; Kogut &
Ritov, 2005a, 2005b, 2011; Small, et al., 2007) this study
shows that identifiability of a target does not always in-
crease willingness to help. Notably, we find that the effect
of identifying information on willingness to donate poten-
tially lifesaving vaccines to single targets is negative (albeit
at the 10% significance level only) in the two Swedish ex-
periments conducted with student samples. For the exper-
iment conducted in the USA with a diverse sample of the
adult population, the effect of identifiability on willingness
to donate was, however, positive both for the single child
and the group of children. Consequently, our results indi-
cate that the influence of identifiability on moral decisions
is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the
literature on helping behavior.
Previous related studies using separate evaluations have
shown that the identifiability effect is particularly strong in
combination with the singularity effect. However, in this
joint evaluation study the question is raised as to whether
singularity can have an effect even when not presented in
combination with identifiability. The analysis of Exp. USA
yielded findings in line with our hypotheses—identification
increased people’s willingness to choose a target in joint
evaluations when making a choice between helping a sin-
gle individual or a group of individuals. Also, the effect of
identifiability in Exp. USA was, as expected, larger for the
single child than for the group of children. The analysis of
Exp. SWE I and Exp. SWE II, however, yielded unexpected
findings—identification of the single target decreased sub-
jects’ willingness to choose the single child. Although the
negative effect from identifying the single target was sur-
prising, the finding is in line with the results from another
Swedish study, which also found a negative effect of identi-
fiability in a diverse adult sample (n=1270), when exploring
priority setting decisions within a health care context (Wiss,
Levin, & Tinghög, 2015). Wiss et al. used dilemmas similar
in structure to the dilemma used in the present study7 indi-
cating that a negative effect of identifiability can be found
also in decision making contexts other than charitable giv-
ing.
7Subjects were asked to choose between treating a single patient or a
group of eight patients. Identifiability of the single patient was varied be-
tween treatments.
The negative effect of identification was most pronounced
in Exp. SWE I where the single child was presented as liv-
ing in an inaccessible mountain village while the five chil-
dren were living in a more accessible village. When both
the single child and the group of children were presented as
non-identified in Exp. SWE I as many as 40% of subjects
chose to allocate the vaccine to the single child compared to
24% when both were identified. This result shows that, in
certain contexts, singularity alone can have an important ef-
fect on allocation decisions in a joint evaluation setting. The
reason for having a different description for the single child
compared to the group of children was to give a reasonable
explanation why it was possible to treat five children with
the same resources used for one child. This might, how-
ever, have made subjects perceive the single child as more
vulnerable in Exp. SWE I compared to the other experi-
ments. Such considerations would reflect the ethical impera-
tive rule of rescue, described by Jonsen (1986) as “our moral
response to the imminence of death demands that we rescue
the doomed” (p. 174). However, the remote/accessible fac-
tor was not varied orthogonally and consequently our find-
ings related to this effect should be interpreted with some
caution. Why the single child would appear more vulnerable
to subjects when non-identified is a matter for speculation.
But it seems reasonable to assume that subjects pay more
attention to the written information when the scenario does
not include content that makes the single child identifiable,
enhancing the perception of the vulnerability of the single
child. When the presented scenarios include photographs
and names of the child/children, however, subjects may in-
creasingly rely on this identifying information as the main
input in the decision-making process. The written infor-
mation in the scenario may accordingly affect the decision-
making process less when it is accompanied by information
that makes targets identifiable.
Overall, the findings from this study indicate that the ef-
fect of identification related to the group is more stable,
while the effect of identification of a single target is more
sensitive to contextual differences. These results are in line
with previous research showing that the information pro-
cessing related to a single target is different (deeper and
more coherent) compared to information processing related
to a group of children in need (e.g., Kogut & Ritov, 2005a,
2005b; Västfjäll et al., 2014).
Turning more explicitly to aspects related to moral
decision-making, almost one-third (32.6%) of the subjects
in our pooled sample chose the non-benefit-maximizing op-
tion when allocating vaccines. Although this share of re-
spondents choosing the deontological default option is not
an atypical share for the standard bystander dilemmas, we
were still surprised to see that judgments from hypothetical
dilemmas are transferable to more realistic scenarios where
choices carry real consequences.
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4.2 Emotional reactance and emotional up-
scaling
The negative effect of identifying the single child in the
Swedish sample was initially surprising. After considering
potential causes for this effect we propose two non-mutually
exclusive explanations why identifiability for single targets
may sometimes have a negative effect in joint evaluation
settings—emotional reactance and emotional upscaling.
The emotional reactance effect has been described by
Berkowitz (1973) as “a demand, explicit or implicit, to help
someone, and even a felt obligation to do this, is often re-
sented because the demand or obligation is a bothersome
threat to the individual’s freedom of action” (p. 310). In
the context of this study, the implication would be that in-
dividuals experience an increased pressure to aid the identi-
fied child when presented alongside a non-identified group
and this could negatively affect their willingness to choose
the identified child. To explore emotional reactance, we
asked subjects in Exp. SWE II and Exp. USA to state their
agreement with the statement “I felt that Benge [the sin-
gle child] should not get a ‘special treatment’ ” on a scale
from 1 to 6. In the American sample no significant differ-
ence in mean values for when the single child was identified
versus non-identified was observed (t-test MeanCHILDID =3.4
vs. MeanCHILDNONID = 3.33, p=.770). However, in accor-
dance with the emotional reactance effect, subjects in the
Swedish sample agreed with this statement to a greater ex-
tent when the child was identified rather than when not iden-
tified (t-test MeanCHILDID=4.15, vs. MeanCHILDNONID=3.10,
p<.001). The fact that a larger share of the Swedish subjects
considered that the child should not get special treatment
when identified could explain why the Swedish samples in
general were less willing than the USA sample to donate the
vaccine to the single identified child. This possibility was
also supported by a mediation analysis which showed that
the mediator (“I felt that Benge [the single child] should not
get a special treatment”) was significant in the Swedish sam-
ple (Sobel test, p=.029) but not in the US sample (Sobel test,
p=.772).
A second possible explanation why identifiability may
have a negative effect on individuals’ willingness to help
single victims is emotional upscaling. Due to the joint eval-
uation design used in the experiments, where two options
are presented side-by-side, the emotional response to help
the one identified child could potentially be transferred and
“scaled up” to the group of children. Such an explanation
would be in line with recent work by Hsee, Zhang, Wang
and Zhang (2013) who found that asking subjects to con-
sider a single cause before expressing their willingness to
pay for a larger cause increased the donations to the larger
cause relative to a condition where the single cause did not
precede the larger (a unit asking effect where the values for
the single unit is scaled). Emotional upscaling is also con-
sistent with research by Markowitz, Slovic, Västfjäll and
Hodges (2013) who found that environmentalists who care
about the cause of saving an entire species do not show a
decrease in affect and donations when the numbers of en-
dangered animals increase. However, a number of questions
designed to measure emotional upscaling (in Exp. SWE II
and Exp. USA) did not provide support for this explanation.
For example, subjects were asked “My feelings for the sin-
gle child made me feel more intensely for the five children.”
Responses to this, and similar questions, did not show any
differences between treatments. However, it is possible that
subjects in general have limited capacity to self-reflect on
these types of questions given that it is likely to be an un-
conscious emotional process.
4.3 Comparing Sweden and the United States
A finding that appears very conspicuous in this study is the
difference in behavior between the Swedish and American
study samples. In the US sample the effect of identifiabil-
ity was significantly positive both for the single child and
the group. In the Swedish samples there was no positive
effect of identification. Instead the effect of identifying the
single child was overall negative in the Swedish samples.
Although these cross-cultural differences are potentially in-
teresting it should be acknowledged that this study was not
explicitly designed to study such differences. There are
slight variations in sample characteristics and experimental
designs which potentially could account for why the posi-
tive effect of identifiability on willingness to help was more
pronounced in the American sample. Still, our result is an
indication of the existence of cross-cultural differences with
regards to how individuals are affected by identifiability. We
speculate below about two potential explanations for such
cross-cultural differences between Sweden and the United
States.
First, in the United States values associated with the in-
dividual have traditionally been emphasized whereas values
associated with the collective have traditionally been em-
phasized in Sweden. In the United States, individual rights
are outlined within the Bill of Rights as part of the Constitu-
tion and freedom of choice and individualism has been the
core focus of the political landscape. Sweden has a long-
standing tradition of a strong welfare state with a focus on
equality and collectivism. Moreover, Sweden has tradition-
ally emphasized uniform and collective solutions through
the public sector—from daycare to education and health
care. As a consequence of the strong focus on collective val-
ues the “Law of Jante” is often used to describe the Swedish
mentality towards individual success. The idea of the law of
Jante is that there is a pattern of group behavior towards in-
dividuals within Scandinavian communities that negatively
portrays individual success as unworthy. Swedish subjects
would, in line with this type of reasoning, be less willing to
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choose the identified single child since he represents some-
one outside of the collective (i.e., the group). Identifiability
in a joint evaluation setting is likely to trigger the law of
Jante mentality leading to a negative or no effect of identifi-
ability for the single child.
A second explanation relates to whether the victims are
perceived as belonging to an in- or outgroup. Two comple-
mentary findings may be related to the difference between
US and Swedish samples. First, Kogut and Ritov (2007)
found that generosity increased towards identified in-group
recipients when belonging to the same social categorization.
It is possible that the U.S. respondents to a higher extent
perceive the African children as a form of in-group. The
population in the United States consists of approximately
14 % African-American citizens compared to a relatively
small share of the population being of African origin in Swe-
den. This difference could potentially have an effect on the
perceived in-group/out-group belonging of the US and the
Swedish respondents, partially explaining why the positive
effect of identification in general is less pronounced in Swe-
den compared to United States. On the other hand, the fact
that Sweden has had a long tradition of very little need for
in-group giving (because of the social welfare system), and
aid campaigns focusing on helping other groups in need es-
pecially from African countries, could also affect perceived
in-group/out-group belonging of respondents. In fact, it is
possible (though not directly tested here) that African chil-
dren are a form of in-group—at least in the context of aid
decisions. Such an interpretation would be in line with Ritov
& Kogut (2011) who found that the identifiability of a vic-
tim decreased the generosity to in-group recipients, but in-
creased generosity to out-group recipients. Future research
should explicitly test the perception of in-group/out-group
belonging in joint evaluation moral dilemmas and in differ-
ent cultural contexts.
4.4 Conclusion
In sum, our results show that identifying the recipient of
aid does not always increase the willingness to help. The
hypothesis that subjects will allocate relatively more vac-
cines to identified children compared to children presented
as non-identified was supported only by the results from one
of the three experiments. The present research provides fur-
ther evidence that the singularity of targets, independently
of their identifiability, can have an important effect on allo-
cation decisions. However, contrary to our expectation that
the effect of identifiability is larger for a single child com-
pared to a group of children, results from the two Swedish
samples indicated a negative effect, which was mediated by
emotional reactance. A further noteworthy finding from this
study is the large fraction of subjects who chose the non-
benefit-maximizing option. On average 32.6 % of all sub-
jects chose to allocate the vaccine to the single child instead
of the group of five children. This suggests that there is a
strong deontological “do no harm” rule operating even in
realistic bystander dilemmas.
In a broader perspective, this study highlights the impor-
tance for decision makers in all sectors and all societies to be
aware of potential biases that might affect judgment and de-
cision making and that could create sub-optimal situations
where social benefits are not maximized. For example, the
health-care sector is one area where the identifiability and
singularity effects could have an effect. In order to have
an informed debate on to what extent certain groups should
or should not be given special considerations when setting
health-care priorities, it is important to have a firm under-
standing of the psychological mechanisms, such as identifia-
bility and singularity, at play when making these judgments.
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